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Abstract 
In this paper we present a model of oligopoly and financial constraints. We study allocations which are 
bankruptcy-free (BF) in the sense that no firm can drive another firm to bankruptcy without becoming 
bankrupt. We show how such allocations can be sustained as an equilibrium of a dynamic game. 
When there are two firms, all equilibria yield BF allocations. When there are more than two firms, 
allocations other than BF can be sustained as equilibria but in some cases the set of BF allocations 
still useful in explaining the shape of equilibrium set. 
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1. Introduction
There is ample evidence that nancial constraints play an important role in the behavior of rms
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). We begin with the observation that the
punishment for violation of a nancial constraint must be severe or otherwise rms would default
all the time. Suppose that the punishment is so severe that rms violating nancial constraints
loose the ability to compete and, in fact, disappear (Sharfstein and Bolton, 1990). Firms might
then have incentives to take actions that will make it impossible for competitors to fulll nancial
constraints in the hope to get rid of them.
In this paper we provide a model of oligopolistic interaction among rms when they fully
take into account the nancial constraints of all other rms and not only their own nancial
constraints. We model these nancial constraints by assuming that prots must be greater than
or equal to an exogenously given value. When prots are below this value, we will say that this
rm is bankrupted. Our aim is to o¤er a dynamic theory of oligopoly in which rms can bankrupt
each other. This theory is in sharp contrast to the standard theory of repeated games in which
bankruptcy considerations are not considered.
Our rst step is to dene the set of actions that are bankruptcy-free (BF in the following). This
set of actions has two properties. On the one hand, prots are not less than some exogenously
given value for any rm. On the other hand, no rm can be pushed below this value by any
action of another rm that obtains prots in excess of this value. The concept of BF captures the
opportunities for ruining other players that are not captured by standard concepts such as Cournot
equilibrium. We show that such a concept plays an important role in shaping the set of long-run
equilibria in an industry.
Our second step consists of characterizing the set of BF actions under alternative assumptions.
For simplicity, we conne ourselves to the case in which the product is homogeneous.1 In the
case in which average costs are non-decreasing, we show that a large number of output vectors
are BF (Proposition 1). For instance, when all rms have constant average costs and all rms are
identical, any output vector yielding non-negative prots is BF (Example 1). When there are two
rms with identical increasing average costs, the set of BF output vectors is a square (Example 2).
By contrast, when average costs are decreasing, BF output vectors are either such that all rms
1We note that some forms of product heterogeneity are equivalent to product homogeneity.
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have zero prots and further increases in output produce negative prots or those in which only
one rm is active (Proposition 2 and Example 3). Thus, BF captures the idea, present in many
informal discussions, that markets with non-decreasing costs and markets with decreasing costs are
fundamentally di¤erent. In our case this is because under increasing costs, ruining a competitor
requires an increase in the average cost that makes the attacking rm weaker. Under decreasing
costs, ruining a competitor implies a decrease in average costs that make the attacking rm even
stronger.
Our next step is to consider a dynamic game in which rms can be bankrupted and accordingly
they might disappear. This setup is not a repeated game because the game in each period depends
on the strategies chosen in the past. Rather it is a special case of a stochastic game (Shapley, 1953;
Neyman and Sorin, 2003) in which transition probabilities are zero or one (Masso and Neme, 1996).
Such games are called Dynamic Games. To simplify our task we make two assumptions: prots
cannot be transferred from one period to the next and the nancial constraint in each period
requires that prots must be non-negative in each period. The second assumption is innocuous
because it entails just a numerarization of prots. However, the rst assumption is certainly not
innocuous and is discussed later on.
We rst note that if the Nash equilibrium (NE) corresponding to the static game is BF, this
allocation can be supported as a Subgame Perfect NE (SPNE). Next, we show for duopoly that
when the discount rate is su¢ ciently close to one, any NE must yield BF allocations (Proposition
3). Unfortunately, this result cannot extended to three players (Example 4). Given this result,
we study equilibria by considering separately the cases in which average costs are increasing and
decreasing.2
Consider rst increasing average costs. The concept of minimax payo¤ plays an important role
here (as in the folk theorem for repeated games) but it has to be adapted to the case in which
actions are constrained to be BF. We refer to this adaptation as the minimax BF payo¤. We show
that any BF action prole that gives a payo¤ greater than the minimax BF payo¤ can be supported
as an SPNE for a discount factor close to one (Proposition 5). Furthermore, payo¤s less than the
minimax BF payo¤ cannot be sustained in any SPNE (Proposition 4).
Finally, we tackle the case of decreasing average costs. We show that BF action proles with at
2The case of constant returns is a limit case between increasing a decreasing average costs and is briey considered.
3
least two active rms cannot be supported by an NE and we give conditions under which BF action
proles with only one active rm can be supported as NE (Proposition 7). We also show that action
proles in which all rms produce a positive quantity cannot be supported as NE (Proposition 8).
However, there are SPNE with all but one active rms (Example 8).
Our results show that introduction of a nancial constraint a¤ects the equilibrium strategies
of rms and, in some cases, substantially reduces the set of equilibrium payo¤s. For example,
Proposition 3 implies that the folk theorem of repeated games does not hold in our setup. Moreover,
playing the Cournot equilibrium in each period and the standard stick-and-carrot punishments need
not be an NE either. This shows that our approach has important implications for collusion, merger
and thus, anti-trust policy.
We end this introduction with a preliminary discussion of the literature (see more on this in
the nal section). Although a number of papers demonstrate that the nancial structure does
a¤ect market outcomes in oligopoly, most previous studies adopt either static or two-stage models.
Kawakami and Yoshida (1997) and Spagnolo (2000) are the only two exceptions. Both papers make
use of repeated games like ours. The former incorporates a simple exit constraint into the repeated
prisonersdilemma. In their model, each rm must exit from the market no matter how it plays if
the rival deviates over a certain period of time. Fixing the length of such an endurable period of time
intrinsic to each rm, they show that predation can occur when a discount factor becomes large. The
latter study examines the role of stock options in repeated Cournot games. In this model, unlike
standard repeated games, rms do not necessarily maximize average discounted prots because
stock options a¤ect managersincentives. Considering this e¤ect, Spagnolo shows that collusion is
easily achieved. Finally, our approach might provide support to the notion that rms may engage
in predatory activities when pursuing prot maximization. Standard explanations of this behavior
are based on incomplete information (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), the learning curve (Cabral and
Riordan, 1994) or rms playing an attrition game (Roth, 1996). In our model, rms have complete
information, the technology is xed and rms play standard quantity-setting games. However, our
concept of BF focuses on allocations in which predation is impossible. Predation in equilibrium
might occur when there are sunk costs.3
3An example is available under request.
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2. Bankruptcy-Free Allocations
There are n rms. Each rm, say i, has an action space denoted by Si. An action could be an
output, a price, a supply function, etc. An action prole is a vector of actions s 2 ni=1Si. Let
s i = (s1; ::; si 1; si+1; ::; sn); and (s^i; s i) = (s1; ::; si 1; s^i; si+1; ::; sn): The prot of rm i depends
on the action prole and is denoted by i(s).
Denition 1. An action prole s^ = (s^1; s^2; ::::; s^n) is bankruptcy-free (BF) if:
a) i(s^)  0; for all i 2 f1; ::; ng.
b) For all sj such that j(s^ j ; sj)  0; i(s^ j ; sj)  0 for all i 6= j:
In other words, a prole of actions is BF if it yields non negative prots for all rms and no rm
can change its action, obtain non-negative prots and ruin other rm. Note that if rms are required
to make vi prots to avoid bankruptcy, we can dene a new prot function as 0i(s)  i(s)   vi
and redene BF with respect to this new prot function.
To grasp the implications of BF on economic environments, in this section we study the set of
BF actions in the quantity-setting model, one of the most popular models in industrial organization.
Let si = xi where xi 2 R+ denotes the quantity set by rm i. Let x = (x1; ::; xn) be a quantity
prole and pi(x) be the inverse demand function for rm i assumed to be strictly decreasing in xi.
Let ci(xi) be the cost of producing xi for rm i: The average cost of producing xi is denoted by
AV Ci(xi). Unless stated specically we will assume that ci(0) = 0. We assume that prots for any
rm are a concave function of its own output when this output is positive.
Spence (1980) observed that some models of product heterogeneity can be transformed into the
model of a single homogeneous product. Given this observation we will concentrate on the case of
product homogeneity. If a rm is producing a positive quantity we call it an active rm. Otherwise
it is an inactive rm. Clearly, an action prole with all inactive rms and no sunk costs is BF: In
what follows we concentrate in the characterization of BF action proles with at least an active
rm.
We start by characterizing the set of BF action proles for n rms with non-decreasing average
costs. We assume that for all i; and for all x i ; there exist xi 6= 0 such that i(x i; xi) = 0: To
build intuition, we rst consider two examples.
Example 1. Suppose there are two rms whose average cost is constant with inverse demand
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p(x1; x2) = 2 x1 x2. First, set AV C1 = 1 and AV C2 = 1:5. In Figure 1, the set of allocations in
which rm 1 (resp. 2) has non negative prots is the triangle with vertex (0; 1; 1) plus the vertical
axis (resp. (0; 0:5; 0:5) plus the horizontal axis). The set of BF action proles is any pair (x^1; x^2)
with 0  x^1  1 and x^2 = 0. If the two rms are equal with AV C1 = AV C2 = 1, the set of BF
allocations is the triangle with vertex (0; 1; 1).
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
x1
x2
Figure 1
It is easy to see that this example can be generalized to more than two rms and any continuous
inverse demand. In this case, only the rm with the lowest average cost can be active in a BF
allocation. Let us consider now the case in which average costs are increasing.
Example 2. Suppose there are two rms with identical increasing average costs ci(xi) = 0:5x2i ;
i = 1; 2. The inverse demand function is p(x1; x2) = (10   x1   x2). Thus, i(x1; x2) = (10  
x1   x2)xi   0:5x2i ; i = 1; 2. In Figure 2, the area where x2  10   1:5x1 plus the vertical axis
(resp. x1  10   1:5x2 plus the horizontal axis) is the locus of points in which rm 1 (resp. 2)
has non-negative prots. Both lines intersect at (4; 4). Starting from any action prole in the
square [0; 4] [0; 4], we see that a unilateral change in output by, say, rm 1 cannot drive rm 2 to
bankruptcy without rm 1 being bankrupt itself. However a point such as (1; 5) is not BF because
rm 1 can produce output of 3 and drive rm 2 to bankruptcy without being bankrupt itself.
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Again the above example can be generalized to two rms with continuous increasing average
costs and facing a continuous and decreasing inverse demand function whenever (x^1; x^2) such that
i(x^1; x^2) = 0; and x^i 6= 0; i = 1; 2; exist. In these cases, an action prole (x1; x2) is BF if and
only if xi  x^i for all i 2 f1; 2g and i(x1; x2)  0.
We are now prepared for our rst characterization that covers all the above cases.
Proposition 1. Let n rms have non-decreasing average costs. An action prole x = (x1; :::; xn)
is BF if i(x)  0 for all i 2 N; and any of the following conditions hold.
(i) All rms have the same average cost, that is, AV Cj(xj) = AV Ck(xk) for all j; k; or
(ii) For all active rms j; k if AV Cj(xj) < AV Ck(xk); rm j can always increases its output in a
way that matches the average cost of rm k, retaining non negative prots. That is, there is ~xj
such that AV Cj(~xj) = AV Ck(xk); and p(
P
i6=j xi + ~xj) AV Cj(~xj)  0:
If a rm j is inactive, then for all x0j 6= 0 such that j(x j ; x0j) = 0; AV Cj(x0j) > AV Ck(xk) for all
active rms k:
Proof. It is obvious that the action proles described in (i) are BF: For the action proles
described in (ii); since the average cost is non-decreasing it is obvious that no rm with positive
production can drive a rm with lower average cost to bankruptcy. It is also obvious that no
inactive rm can enter the market and drive the active rms to bankruptcy. We also show that
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it is not possible for a rm with positive production to drive a rm with higher average cost to
bankruptcy. Let xj be such that
p(
X
i6=j
xi + xj)  AV Cj(xj): (2.1)
If AV Cj(xj)  AV Ck(xk); since the average cost is non-decreasing, then p(
P
i6=j xi + xj)  
AV Ck(xk)  0: If AV Cj(xj) < AV Ck(xk); then AV Cj(xj) < AV Cj(~xj); and since average cost
is non-decreasing, xj < ~xj : Then p(
P
i6=j xi + xj) > p(
P
i6=j ~xi + ~xj)  AV Cj(~xj) = AV Ck(xk):
Therefore, for all k 6= j; with higher average cost p(Pi6=j xi + xj) AV Ck(xk)  0:
Finally, we show that any other action prole cannot be BF:
Let x0 = (x01; :::; x0n) be such that i(x0)  0 for all i 2 N; and suppose that there are two
active rms, j and k; with AV Cj(x0j) < AV Ck(x
0
k); and such that, for ~xj with AV Cj(~xj) =
AV Ck(x
0
k); p(
P
i6=j x
0
i + ~xj)   AV Cj(~xj) < 0: Since j(x0) > 0 and the price-average cost dif-
ference is decreasing, rm j can decrease production and make cero prots. That is, there is
xj < ~xj such that p(
P
i6=j x
0
i + xj)   AV Cj(xj) = 0: Since AV Cj(xj) < AV Cj(~xj) = AV Ck(x0k);
p(
P
i6=j x
0
i + xj)   AV Cj(xj) > p(
P
i6=j x
0
i + xj)   AV Ck(x0k); which implies that rm j can drive
rm k to bankruptcy.
Let x0 = (x01; :::; x0n) be such that i(x0) 0 for all i 2 N; and suppose that there are two active rms,
j and k; with AV Cj(x0j) < AV Ck(x
0
k); and such that rm j can never match the average cost of rm
k; that is, for all ~xj ; AV Cj(~xj) < AV Ck(x0k): Let xj be such that p(
P
i6=j x
0
i+ xj) AV Cj(xj) = 0:
By our assumptions xj exist, and since AV Cj(xj) < AV Ck(x0k); rm k is bankrupt.
Finally, if for an inactive rm k there is an xk 6= 0 such that AV Cj(x0j) > AV Ck(xk) and
p(
P
i6=k x
0
i + xk) = AV Cj(x
0
j); rm k can increase his production above xk and make rm j bank-
rupt while retaining positive prots.
We now consider the case of decreasing average costs. As before, to build intuition we rst
consider an example.
Example 3. Suppose there are two rms with cost functions ci(xi) = 88 + 10xi; for all xi 6= 0;
and ci(0) = 0: Let p(x1+ x2) = 100  x1  x2: The area in which both rms have positive prots is
x2  90  x1  88=x1 (continuous line in Figure 3) and x1  90  x2  88=x2 (dotted line in Figure
3). Point B = (B1; B2) = (44; 44) is a BF action prole such that i(x^1; x^2) = 0: Note that when
x1 = x2 = 1, both agents also have zero prots, but this action prole is not BF because, say,
8
rm 1 can produce output of 88, obtaining zero prots and bankrupting rm 2. Also note that all
action proles such that x2 = 0; x1  B1 and 1(x1; 0)  0, or x1 = 0; x2  B2 and 2(0; x2)  0
are BF: It is easy to see in Figure 3 that no other action prole can be BF:
1007550250
100
75
50
25
0
x1
x2
B
B1
B2
Figure 3
Our next result characterizes the set of BF allocations under decreasing average costs. We
restrict our attention to economies that satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The inverse demand function is strictly decreasing and limx!1p(x) = 0: Each
rm has decreasing average cost with limx!1AV Ci(x) = ai > 0; and there is (x1; ::; xn) such that
p(x1 + ::+ xn) > AV Ci(xi) for all i 2 f1; ::; ng:
Assumption 1 guarantees the existence and uniqueness of an action prole (x^1; ::; x^n) >> (0; ::; 0)
such that j(x^1; ::; x^n) = 0; and @j(x^1; ::; x^n)=@xj < 0 for all j 2 f1; ::; ng:
We will use this action prole (x^1; ::; x^n) in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1; an action prole x = (x1; ::; xn) is BF if i(x)  0 for all
i 2 N; and any of the following conditions hold.
(i) There is only one active rm, i. For this rm xi  x^i;
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(ii) There are at least two active rms. For all active rms; i(x1; ::; xn) = 0 and @i(x1; ::; xn)=@xi <
0; for all inactive rms, i(xi; x i) < 0 for all xi > 0:
Proof. Step 1. We show rst that no action prole (x1; :::; xn) such that at least two rms
are active and at least one has strictly positive prots is BF:
Without lost of generality, suppose that rm 1 and 2 are active, and 1(x1; ::; xn) > 0. If
2(x1; ::; xn) = 0; then AV C1(x1) < AV C2(x2): If 2(x1; ::; xn) > 0; suppose w.l.o.g. that
AV C1(x1)  AV C2(x2): Let y > x1 be such that 1(y; x2; ::; xn) = 0; by Assumption 1, y ex-
ist. If rm 1 increases its production from x1 to y; the price will be equal to the average cost of
y; and since the average cost is decreasing, AV C1(y) < AV C1(x1): Since AV C1(x1)  AV C2(x2);
rm 2 is bankrupt.
Step 1 tells us that only action proles such that all rms have zero prots or action proles for
which only one rm has positive prots and all others are not active can be BF:
Step 2. We show that an action prole (x1; :::; xn); such that for all i 2 f1; :::; ng; i(x1; ::; xn) = 0;
with at least two active rms and such that @i(x1 + ::+ xn)=@xi  0 for some of the active rms,
is not BF:
Suppose that the rm with the above characteristics is rm 1: Since @i(x1+ ::+xn)=@xi  0; rm
1 can slightly increase its output and obtain non negative prots. Since the price will decrease, all
other active rms will be bankrupt.
Step 3. We show that an action prole (x1; :::; xn); such that for all i 2 f1; :::; ng; i(x1; ::; xn) = 0;
with at least two active rms such that for all active rms @i(x1+ ::+xn)=@xi < 0; and such that
for at least one inactive rm j there exist xj > 0 such that j(xj ; x j)  0; cannot be BF:
If this were the case, the inactive rm j could produce xj and retain non negative prots. Since
the price will decrease, all active rms will be bankrupted.
Step 4. We show that the action proles with at least two active rms such that for all i 2
f1; 2; :::; ng, i(x1; ::; xn) = 0; for all active rms @i(x1; ::; xn)=@xi < 0, and for all inactive rms
i(xi; x i) < 0 for all xi > 0, are BF:
Clearly, inactive rms cannot increase production without bankrupting themselves. Active rms
can only bankrupt other active rms by increasing their production, but since @i(x1; ::; xn)=@xi < 0
and prots are concave; this will also bankrupt them.
Step 5. We show that an action prole with only one active rm and such that xi < x^i is not BF:
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Suppose that an inactive rm j produces xj 6= 0 such that xj + xi = x^1 + ::: + x^n: Since xi < x^i,
xj > x^j : Since average cost is decreasing AV Cj(x

j ) < AV Cj(x^j); and thus j(0; ::; xi; 0; ::; x

j ) > 0:
Since p(xj+xi) = p(x^1+::+x^n); and xi < x^i; p(x

j+xi) AV Ci(xi) < p(x^1+::+x^n) AV Ci(x^i) = 0;
which implies that rm i is bankrupt.
Step 6. Finally, we show that action proles with only one active rm and such that xi  x^i are
BF:
We show that no inactive rm j can bankrupt the active rm i:For this it is enough to show that
for all xj such that j(0; ::; xi; ::; x

j ; ::; 0)  0; then i(0; ::; xi; ::; xj ; ::; 0)  0:
Suppose rst that j is such that xi <
P
k 6=j x^k.
If xj < x^j ; then xi+ x

j <
P
k x^k: Since xi  x^i; p(xi+xj ) AV Ci(xi) > p(
P
k x^k) AV Ci(x^i) = 0;
which implies that i(0; ::; xi; ::; xj ; ::; 0)  0:
If xj > x^j ; suppose that i(0; ::; xi; ::; x

j ; ::; 0) = p(xi+x

j ) AV Ci(xi) < 0 = p(
P
k x^k) AV Ci(x^i):
Since xi > x^i; p(xi+xj ) < p(
P
k x^k): Thus, since p is decreasing, xi+x

j >
P
k x^k: Therefore, there
exist t > 0 such that xi + xj = x^j + t +
P
k 6=j x^k. Since prots are concave for strictly positive
values of xj ; and j(x^1; ::; x^n) = 0 with @j(x^1; ::; x^n)=@xj  0; then j(0; ::; xi; ::; xj ; ::; 0) < 0;
which contradicts the hypothesis. Thus, i(0; ::; xi; ::; xj ; ::; 0)  0:
Suppose that j is such that xi 
P
k 6=j x^k.
First, we show that xj  x^j : If xj > x^j ; given that xi 
P
k 6=j x^k; then xi+ x

j >
Pn
k=1 x^k;
but by the denition of (x^1; ::; x^n) and given that prots are concave for strictly positive val-
ues of xj , j(xj ; x j) will be negative. Thus x

j  x^j : Therefore AV Cj(xj )  AV Cj(x^j) =
p(x^1 + :: + x^n) which implies that p(x^1 + :: + x^n)  p(xi+ xj ); and given that xi  x^i; it fol-
lows that p(xi + xj ) AV Ci(xi)  p(x^1 + ::+ x^n) AV Ci(x^i) = 0:
The above steps prove that the BF action proles are those described in (i) and (ii)
Notice that the point (B1; B2) in Example 3 corresponds to the outputs described in part (ii)
in Proposition 2. The outputs in part (i) correspond to those in Example 3 in which one of the
rms is inactive and the other rm produces, at least, the corresponding Bi.
Proposition 2 can be easily adapted to the case in which rms have sunk costs, i.e. c(0) = k. In
this case in any BF action prole all rms must be active, otherwise they are bankrupt. Therefore
the set of BF action proles reduces to those in part (ii) in Proposition 2 (point B in Figure 3).
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3. Long-Run Competition with Bankruptcy
In this section we consider a dynamic game with an innite horizon in which rms can be bankrupt.
We identify conditions under which such dynamic competition leads to BF allocations as dened
in the previous section.
Each rm, say i, has an action space denoted by Si that can be interpreted as the output, price,
etc. set by this rm. In each period, say t, each rm chooses an action sti:
The payo¤s obtained by rm i in period t are denoted by i(st) where st 2 ni=1Si  S is the
tuple of actions played in period t = 1; 2; ::::;  ; :::. Firms cannot accumulate prots, and hence
they become bankrupt as long as they have negative prots in a period. If a rm disappears from
the game in subsequent periods, this rm is supposed to take an action si which corresponds to
no action (i.e. zero output or a price for which demand is always zero). Formally, if i(st) < 0;
i(s
t+r) = 0; and st+ri = si for all r = 1; 2; :::; . Let  2 [0; 1] be the common discount factor.
Payo¤s for the game for rm i are Pi = (1  )
P1
t=0 
ti(s
t). The continuation payo¤ in period t
is given by P ti = (1  )
P1
s=0 
si(s
t+s):
We start this section with a very simple observation. Let (sN1 ; s
N
2 ; :::::::s
N
n ) be a list of actions
that is an NE of the static game, and Ni be the prots obtained by i in an NE of the one-shot
game. Then we have the following:
Observation. Assume that the actions corresponding to a one shot NE are BF . Then:
(i) The allocation corresponding to this NE can be sustained as an SPNE of the dynamic game for
any :
(ii) When  tends to 1, any sequence of action proles that are BF and yield prots larger than Ni
can be sustained as an SPNE.
Proof. (i) From Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 149) if (sN1 ; s
N
2 ; :::; s
N
n ) is an NE of the static
game, then the open-loop strategies i = (s
N
i ; s
N
i ; :::::::s
N
i ; ::::) i = 1; 2; :::; n are an SPNE of the
repeated game when there are no bankruptcy considerations. Since no player is bankrupt in these
actions, the strategies indeed conform to an SPNE of the dynamic game.
(ii) Let (~s1; ~s2; :::; ~st; ::::) be the sequence of action proles with the desired properties. Consider the
following strategy for a generic player, say i. At time 1 play the action ~s1i . At time  = 2; 3; :::; t; :::if
the history only includes actions proles (~s1; ~s2; :::; ~s 1) play ~si . In any other case play s
N
i . It is
clear that such strategies yield the desired sequence of actions. In addition, by the usual reasoning
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such strategies are an SPNE when  is su¢ ciently close to one.
The above observation requires that the set of BF actions and the NE of the static game have
a non-empty intersection. For instance, in Example 1 when the two rms are di¤erent, rm 2
does not produce in the Cournot equilibrium so this equilibrium is BF. In Example 2, Cournot
equilibrium outputs are (2:5; 2:5) and thus they are BF.4
Our rst result corresponds to an asymptotic result for two rms which is independent on both
demand and costs conditions. The result states that, when  is su¢ ciently close to one, any NE of
the dynamic game yields BF action proles in each period. Denoting monopoly prots for rm i
as Mi , we have the following:
Proposition 3. Let n = 2. Suppose that (s11; s
1
2; :::; s
t
1; s
t
2; ::::) is a sequence of actions yielded by
an NE such that there is an  > 0 with i(st) +   Mi for all t = 1; 2; :::; i = 1; 2. Then, when 
tends to 1; (st1; s
t
2) is BF for all t.
Proof. Suppose that in period t, (st1; s
t
2) is not BF: Thus, one rm can bankrupt the other.
Suppose, without loss of generality, it is rm 2. Consider the following strategy for rm 2. In period
t choose an action ~s2, that drives rm 1 into bankruptcy and choose the output corresponding to
monopoly thereafter. In this case, the continuation payo¤ for rm 2 is
(1  )(2(st1; ~s2) + M2 + 2M2 + ::::): (3.1)
The continuation payo¤ at t for the sequence (s11; s
1
2; :::; s
t
1; s
t
2; ::::) is:
(1  )(2(st) + 2(st+1) + 22(st+2) + ::::): (3.2)
By the denition of an NE,
2(s
t) + 2(s
t+1) + 22(s
t+2) + ::::  2(st1; ~s2) + M2 + 2M2 + :::: (3.3)
or
2(s
t)  2(st1; ~s2)  (M2   2(st+1)) + 2(M2   2(st+2)) + ::::  + 2+ :::: = 

1   : (3.4)
Clearly, when  ! 1, the above inequality is impossible, contradicting that we were in an NE.
4More general conditions under which NE and BE have a non-empty intersection are available under request.
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This result can be extended to n rms in the following sense. For a su¢ ciently large ; in an
NE no rm can drive to bankruptcy all other rms with an action as long as for all rms payo¤s in
the NE are less than the monopoly payo¤. However, the generalization of Proposition 3 for n > 2
is not possible. The di¢ culty is that, after, say, rm i is driven bankrupt by an action of rm j,
the strategies of the other rms can be anything. The following example shows that when n > 2 it
is possible to sustain as SPNE allocations that are not BF.
Example 4. Let us consider a market with three rms and an inverse demand function p(
P3
i=1 xi) =
a  P3i=1 xi. Firms have constant average cost such that c1 = c2 < c3 with a > c1 and c3 >
(2c1 + a)=3. The best reply functions are:
xi = maxf0;
a  ci  
P
i6=j xj
2
g; i = 1; 2; 3. (3.5)
The unique Cournot equilibrium is xC1 = x
C
2 =
a c1
3 and x
C
3 = 0.
Now suppose that rms 1 and 2 collude and maximize their joint prots taking into account the
best reply of rm 3. Thus, denoting z  x1+x2; the equilibrium is found by max(a  z x3  c1)z
over (3.5) for i = 3 or max(a  z + c3   2c1)z. This yields
xJ1 = x
J
2 =
a  2c1 + c3
6
; xJ3 =
a  2c3 + c1
3
: (3.6)
Thus, assuming (a + c1)=2 > c3; rm 3 produces a positive output in the collusive outcome.
Assuming also that (a+ c3  2c1) >
p
2(a  c1); 5 guarantees that in this outcome the prots of all
rms are strictly larger than in the Cournot equilibrium.
Now consider the following strategies: x1i = x
J
i i = 1; 2; 3. If x
t r
i = x
J
i for all r 2 f1; 2; ::; t   1g
and i 2 f1; 2; 3g; then xti = xJi : Otherwise xti = xCi .
For  su¢ ciently close to 1, the previous strategies constitute an SPNE that generates actions
xti = x
J
i for all t = 1; 2; :::; T; ::: and i = 1; 2; 3. The proof is virtually identical to that for observation
3.
The previous example shatters our hope of extending Proposition 3 to n > 2. Thus, in what
follows we turn to characterize Nash equilibria under di¤erent assumptions on the technology. This
additional information will provide us with important clues for characterizing the equilibrium set.
5Note that the conditions (2c1 + a)=3 < c3 < (a+ c1)=2 and (a+ c3   2c1) >
p
2(a  c1) are compatible for some
values of the parameters. In particular for c1 = 0; c3 = 4; 5 and a = 10:
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3.1. Dynamics with Increasing Average Cost
We begin by considering the case of Increasing Average Cost under the following extra assumption.6
Assumption 2. All rms have an increasing average cost and product is homogeneous, and
for any subset S  N; there is a unique (x^1; x^2; :::; x^s) with x^i 6= 0 for all i 2 S such that
i(x^1; x^2; :::; x^s) = 0 for all i 2 S:
It is easy to nd su¢ cient conditions on demand and cost functions such that Assumption 2
holds. In what follows, whenever we use the notation (x^1; x^2; :::; x^s) for any S we refer to the vector
described in the Assumption 2. We now adapt the standard denition of a minimax payo¤ to the
case in which actions are constrained to be BF:
We denote by x i 2 Rn 1+ a vector of actions for each rms except rm i: Let B i be the set
of actions x i such that there exist an action for rm i such that (xi; x i) is BF (since the set of
BF action proles is not empty, this set is well dened). For each x i 2 B i; let Bi(x i) = fxi j
(xi; x i) is BFg: The minimax BF payo¤ for rm i is dened as:
im = min
x i2B i
max
xi2Bi(x i)
i(xi; x i): (3.7)
The following lemma gives us a handier expression for the minimax BF payo¤ under Assumption
2.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2, the minimax BF payo¤ is
im = max
xi2[0;x^i]
i(xi; x^ i); (3.8)
where (x^i; x^ i) >> (0; 0) is such that j(x^i; x^ i) = 0 for all j:
Proof. Since the payo¤ of rm i is a¤ected by the aggregate output of the other rms but
not by which rm is producing it, the worse situation for rm i in the BF set is the one with the
maximal aggregate output in the set B i: Note that for all x i 2 B i rm i cannot bankrupt any
other rm. We denote by B i the set of all pairs x i such that rm i cannot bankrupt any of the
other rms: Notice that B i  B i: The set B i is characterized by the following inequalities:
j(xi; x i)  0; for all j 6= i; (3.9)
6The case of constant returns is the boundary between increasing and decreasing average cost curves. Thus this
case is indeed exceptional and we will devote no attention to it.
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where xi = xi(x i) > 0 is such that
i(xi; x i) = 0: (3.10)
The set B i is compact. Thus, the maxx i2 B i
X
j 6=i xj exist. The maximum is reached at x^ i >>
0 such that j(x^i; x^ i) = 0 for all j: By Assumption 2, (x^i; x^ i) is well dened and is a BF action
prole. Thus (x^i; x^ i) 2 B i: Therefore, x^ i = argmaxx i2B i
X
j 6=i xj : Since Bi(x^ i) = [0; x^i];
the minimax BF payo¤ is reduced to:
im = max
xi2[0;x^i]
i(xi; x^ i); (3.11)
and the proof is completed.
In the next proposition we show that, for a su¢ ciently large ; no SPNE of the dynamic game
can give any rm a payo¤ lower than its minimax BF payo¤. To formally introduce the result, we
need the two following lemmas. The proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. Let (x1; ::; xn) be such that all rms have non negative prots. If
X
j 6=i xj >
X
j 6=i x^j ;
then rm i can bankrupt some of the other rms.
Lemma 3. Let S and S0 be such that S  S0; and let k 2 S: The minimax BF payo¤ for rm k in
the economy S (Skm) is larger than the minimax BF payo¤ for rm k in the economy S
0 (S0km):
Proposition 4. There exists 0 2 (0; 1) such that for all  2 (0; 1), i < im cannot be sustained
in any SPNE.
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on the number of rms. We start by showing
that the statement is true when there are only two rms in the market.
With two rms, the minimax BF payo¤ is
im = min
xj2[0;x^j ]
max
xi2[0;x^i]
i(xi; xj): (3.12)
Thus, rm i could have achieved at least im if xtj 2 [0; x^j ] for all t; irrespective of . Therefore, if
i < im happens in equilibrium, xtj > x^j must hold for some t. We show that if this is the case,
the continuation payo¤ for i at t in equilibrium; P ti ; must be such that P
t
i  Mi ; where Mi is
the monopoly prot. Suppose that P ti < 
M
i ; since x
t
j > x^j , rm i can bankrupt rm j retaining
non-negative prots, and can achieve a monopoly prot in every period from t + 1:Under this
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situation, the continuation payo¤ for rm i will be greater than Mi : However, 
M
i > P
t
i , which
contradicts the notion that we are in equilibrium. Thus, P ti  Mi : Since Mi ! Mi as  ! 1;
and im < Mi ; i must exceed im at some point as  increases, which concludes the proof for
n = 2.
Suppose that the proposition is true for n  1 rms. We show that it is true for n rms.
By 3.8, rm i could have achieved at least im if
P
j 6=i x
t
j 
P
j 6=i x^j for all t irrespective of .
Therefore, if i < im occurs in equilibrium,
P
j 6=i x
t
j >
P
j 6=i x^j for some t, and if this is the
case, at t rm i could bankrupt some other rm. Suppose, without lost of generality, that rm i
can bankrupt rm k: Since we start with an equilibrium, whatever the strategies that support this
equilibrium are, they should be such that in the subgame in which all rms but k survive, they
constitute a Nash equilibrium. We denote by N ki a possible payo¤ that rm i can obtain in the
equilibrium of the subgame with all rms but k: Let N ki the set of all those possible payo¤s.
Let us see that the continuation payo¤ for i at t in equilibrium; P ti ; must be such that P
t
i  N ki
for some N ki 2 N ki . Suppose that P ti < N ki for all N ki 2 N ki : If this is the case, rm i
can deviate in period t by bankrupting rm k and retaining non-negative prots and conforming
with the initial strategy thereafter. Thus, rm i can achieve N ki prots in every period from
t+ 1:Under this situation, the continuation payo¤ for rm i will be greater that N ki : However,
N ki > P
t
i , which contradicts the notion that we are in equilibrium. Thus, P
t
i  N ki for some
N ki 2 N ki : By the induction hypothesis, for  su¢ ciently large, N ki  N kim ; where N kim
is the minimax BF payo¤ when the rms in the market are N 8fkg. Since N kim ! N kim and
N kim > 
N
im; i must exceed 
N
im at some point as  increases, which concludes the proof.
Next we give su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an SPNE in our framework. We say that
i is an individually rational BF payo¤ if i > im: An individually rational BF vector payo¤
(i)i2N is feasible if there exist a BF action prole (x1; :::; xn) such that i = i(x1; x2; ::; xn) for
all i 2 N:
Proposition 5. Let  = (i)i2N be a feasible and individually rational BF payo¤ vector. Then,
there exists 0 such that for all  2 (0; 1),  is the average payo¤s in some SPNE.
Proof. The proof is given by constructing an equilibrium which is originally proposed by
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). Let (i)i2N be feasible and individually rational BF payo¤ vector.
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By the denition of feasibility, there is a BF action prole (x1; ::; xn) such that
i = i(x1; ::; xn) for i 2 N: (3.13)
Suppose each rm takes this xi, i 2 N in each period if no deviation has occurred, but all i 2 N
choose x^i, for T periods once one of them unilaterally deviates from the equilibrium path. If no one
deviates during these T periods, then rms go back to the original path. Otherwise, if one of them
deviates, then rms restart this phase for T more periods. We prove that this strategy actually
constitutes an SPNE.
First consider a deviation from the equilibrium path. Suppose rm i takes x0i 6= xi in some period,
say period t. By the one-stage-deviation principle (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.110), a
deviation is protable if and only if rm i could prot by deviating from the original strategy in
period t only and conforming thereafter. Therefore, rm i can benet by deviation if and only if
9x0i such that
(1  )i(x0i; x i) + (1  )( + ::+ T )i(x^i; x^ i) + T+1i
= (1  )i(x0i; x i) + T+1i > i = (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T )i + T+1i
, (1  )f(i(x0i; x i)  i)  ( + :::+ T )ig > 0 (3.14)
Let i = maxx0i i(x
0
i; x i)  i and choose T such that
i < Ti. (3.15)
Note that the left hand side of (3.14) is weakly less than
(1  )fi   ( + :::+ T )ig. (3.16)
This term is non-positive when  is close to 1. Therefore, (3.14) cannot be satised for such T .
By the same argument as above, rm i can benet by deviating from the mutual minmax phase if
and only if 9x00i
(1  )i(x00i ; x^ i) + (1  )( + :::+ T )i(x^i; x^ i) + T+1i
> (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T 1)i(x^i; x^ i) + Ti, (3.17)
which can be written as:
i(x
00
i ; x^ i) > 
Ti: (3.18)
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Note that i(x00i ; x^ i)  maxxi2[0;x^i] i(xi; x^ i) = im: Since i > im by assumption. This implies
that (3.18) never holds when  is close to 1.
Thus, both on and o¤ the equilibrium paths, there is no protable deviation when  is su¢ ciently
close to 1. Since we can always construct the above equilibrium for arbitrary  as long as it is a
feasible and individually rational BF payo¤ vector, the proof is complete.
Note that Propositions 3, 4 and 5, (almost) characterize the SPNE set for two rms and increas-
ing average costs.7 However if n > 2 we can support non BF actions as equilibria as long as they
yield payo¤s above the minimax BF payo¤. In the following proposition we give conditions for this
to occur. For simplicity, we work out the case of n = 3; even though our results can be extended
to any n > 3 at cost of introducing some additional notation. We dene ijim as the minimax BF
payo¤ of rm i when only rms i and j are in the market.
Proposition 6. Let (x1; x2; x3) be a non BF action prole such that i(x1; x2; x3) > im for all
i 2 f1; 2; 3g; and i(x1; x2; x3) > ijim for all i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g: Then, there exists 0 such that for all
 2 (0; 1),  = (i)i2f1;2;3g is the average payo¤s in some SPNE.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that only rm 3 can be bankrupted. Suppose each
rm takes xi, i 2 f1; 2; 3g in each period but if one of then deviates such that no rm is bankrupt,
then rms start to choose x^Si ; i 2 S = f1; 2; 3g for T periods . If no one deviates during these T
periods, then rms go back to the original path. Otherwise, if one of them deviates in one of this
T periods, then rms restart this phase for T more periods. If one rm deviates by bankrupting
rm 3, then rm 1 and 2 chose x^S0i , i 2 S0 = f1; 2g for T periods. If no one deviates during
this phase, then rms chose (x1; x2) a BF action prole in the market with those two rms such
i(x1; x2; x3) > i(x1; x2) > 
ij
im: If one of them deviates from this phase, then rms restart this
phase for T more periods.
We show that this strategy actually constitutes an SPNE.
First consider the deviation on the equilibrium path when no rm is bankrupted. Suppose rm i
takes x0i 6= xi in some period, say period t such that this rm does not bankrupt any other rm.
By the one-stage-deviation principle, deviation is protable if and only if rm i could prot by
deviating from the original strategy in period t only and conforming thereafter. Therefore, rm i
7Only the points in the boundary are not considered in these propositions.
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can benet by deviation if and only if 9x0i such that
(1  )i(x0i; xj ; xk) + (1  )( + ::+ T )i(x^Si ; x^Sj ; x^Sk ) + T+1i
= (1  )i(x0i; xj ; xk) + T+1i > i = (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T )i + T+1i
, (1  )f(i(x0i; xj ; xk)  i)  ( + :::+ T )ig > 0: (3.19)
Let i = maxx0i i(x
0
i; xj ; xk)  i and choose T such that
i < Ti. (3.20)
Note that the left hand side of (3.19) is weakly less than
(1  )fi   ( + :::+ T )ig. (3.21)
This term is non-positive when  is close to 1. Therefore, (3.19) cannot be satised for such T .
Deviations from the mutual minmax phase cannot bankrupt any rm because (x^S1 ; x^
S
2 ; x^
S
3 ) is BF:
Thus, by the same argument as above, rm i can benet by deviating from the mutual minmax
phase if and only if 9x00i
(1  )i(x00i ; x^Sj ; x^Sk ) + (1  )( + :::+ T )i(x^Si ; x^Sj ; x^Sk ) + T+1i
> (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T 1)i(x^Si ; x^Sj ; x^Sk ) + Ti, (3.22)
which can be written as:
i(x
00
i ; x^
S
j ; x^
S
k ) > 
Ti: (3.23)
Note that i(x00i ; x^
S
j ; x^
S
k )  maxxi2[0;x^i] i(xi; x^Sj ; x^Sk ) = im: Since i > im by assumption. This
implies that (3.23) never holds when  is close to 1.
Now, consider deviations whereby one rm can bankrupt rm 3. Suppose this rm is rm 1. Firm
1 can benet by deviating if and only if 9x01 that bankrupt rm 3 and such that
(1  )1(x01; x2; x3) + (1  )( + ::+ T )1(x^S
0
1 ; x^
S0
2 ) + 
T+11(x1; x2)
> i = (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T )i + T+1i: (3.24)
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Since i > 1(x1; x2): The above inequality is true if and only if
(1  )1(x01; x2; x3) + (1  )( + ::+ T )1(x^S
0
1 ; x^
S0
2 )
> (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T )i:
, (1  )f(i(x0i; xj ; xk)  i)  ( + :::+ T )ig > 0: (3.25)
However, bankrupting a rm always has a cost, and therefore, i(x0i; xj ; xk)   i < 0: Thus, the
above inequality can never hold.
Deviations from the mutual minmax phase with two rms cannot bankrupt any rm because
(x^S
0
1 ; x^
S0
2 ) is BF: Thus, by the same argument as above, rm 1 (the same argument applies to rm
2) can benet by deviating from the mutual minmax phase if and only if 9x00i
(1  )1(x001; x^S
0
2 ) + (1  )( + :::+ T )1(x^S
0
1 ; x^
S0
2 ) + 
T+11(x1; x2)
> (1  )(1 +  + :::+ T 1)1(x^S01 ; x^S
0
2 ) + 
T1(x1; x2):
The previous inequality can be written as:
1(x
00
1; x^
S0
2 ) > 
T1(x1; x2): (3.26)
Note that 1(x00i ; x^
S0
2 )  maxx12[0;x^S01 ] 1(x1; x^
S0
2 ) = 
12
1m: Since 1(x1; x2) > 
12
1m, (3.26) never holds
when  is closed to one.
Thus, both on and o¤ the equilibrium paths, there is no protable deviation when  is su¢ ciently
close to 1.
We note that when rms are required to make vi prots in order to be not bankrupted and
vi < 0 this vi can be considered as a part of the cost. In this case, even if we have constant returns
to scale, the transformed cost function displays increasing average costs. We now work out an
example for two rms with identical constant average cost but di¤erent nancial constraints. This
special case will allow us to illustrate how the set of feasible and individually rational BF payo¤
vectors changes with the nancial constraints, and we show that, in some situations, the symmetric
collusive output cannot be sustained as an equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Example 5. Let n = 2; p = (3  x1   x2); c = 1: Let  be the set of feasible individually rational
bankruptcy free payo¤ vectors. In Figure 4, 5,6 and 7 we represent the set  under di¤erent
scenarios. In the gures, the interior dot denotes the payo¤ for the static Cournot equilibrium,
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1 = 2 = 4=9. The dot on the line denotes the payo¤ in a symmetric collusive outcome whereby
rms set a monopoly price and equally divide the share, 1 = 2 = 1=2:
(a) If there is no nancial constraints,  is the set of feasible individually rational payo¤ vectors.
 = f(1; 2) j 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 1 + 2  1g: (3.27)
(1/2, 1/2)
(4/9, 4/9)
0 1
1
π 2
π 1
Figure 4
(b) If v1 = v2 =  0:5
 = f(1; 2) j 1 > 1m; 2 > 2m; 1 + 2  1g: (3.28)
0 1
1
π 2
π 1
Figure 5
(c) If v1 =  0:25; v2 =  1
 = f(1; 2) j 1 > 1m; 2 > 2m; 1 + 2  1g: (3.29)
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0 1
1
π 2
π 1
Figure 6
(d) If v1 =  0:01; v2 =  0:2
 = f(1; 2) j 1 > 1m; 2 > 2m; 1 + 2  1g: (3.30)
0 1
1
π 2
π 1
Figure 7
To summarize, Propositions 4 and 5 point out that introduction of nancial constraints shrinks
the set of equilibrium payo¤s. Example 5 shows that, under asymmetric nancial constraints, the
set of equilibrium payo¤s shrinks in favor of a rm that has a larger nancial budget.
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3.2. Dynamics with Decreasing Average Cost
We address the case of decreasing average costs. We recall that under Assumption 1, only two kind
of action prole are BF . Action proles in which there is only one active rm (i.e. those under the
heading (i) in Proposition 2) and action proles in which at least two rms are active and earn zero
prots (i.e. those under the heading (ii) in Proposition 2). In the following proposition we show
that the BF action proles with at least two active rms cannot be supported by an NE and we
give conditions under which BF action proles with only one active rm can be supported as NE.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 1, a BF action prole ~x = (~x1; ~x2; :::; ~xn) can be supported as
an NE i¤: (i) There is only one rm, say j, with ~xj > 0. (ii) ~xj limits the entry of all other rms.
(iii) ~xj is a monopoly output for rm j.
Proof. Su¢ ciency. Consider open loop strategies in which all rms play (~x1; ~x2; :::; ~xn) in
each period. Since ~xj limits the entry of all other rms and it is a monopoly output (~x1; ~x2; :::; ~xn)
is an NE of the one period game and thus these open-loop strategies form, indeed, a NE.
Necessity. Let (1; 2; :::; n) be a list of strategies that constitute NE and yields in each period a
BF action prole. Suppose that for some period t there are two rms with positive output. Since
the action prole is BF; by part (ii) in Proposition 2, i(x1; ::; xn) = 0 and @i(x1; ::; xn)=@xi < 0 for
all active rms. Thus, at t rm i can reduces an " its output and produce zero in any subsequent
period. However, since @i(x1; ::; xn)=@xi < 0; with this strategy rm i makes positive prots,
which contradicts the notion that we are in NE. Thus, in a NE, one rm at most is active. The
possibility that in NE no rm is active can be discarded because one rm would enter in a period,
earn positive prots and produce zero thereafter. Thus, in each period there is only one active rm
and (i) above holds. The output of the active rm must deter entry because otherwise a hit and
run entry by another rm would be protable for this rm, so (ii) also holds. Finally, if rm j is
not producing a monopoly output, a one period change of output by this rm (continuing with the
limit output thereafter) improves the prots of this rm, contradicting the notion that we are in
NE.
Our results here give some support to the idea (which underlies the concept of natural monopoly)
that under increasing returns only one rm can survive in equilibrium. Indeed, when n = 2 this is
the only allocation that can be sustained as an SPNE.
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It remains to be shown whether non BF action proles can be sustained as an SPNE. Although
we do not have a general answer to this question, in the next proposition we show that action
proles whereby all rms produces a positive quantity cannot be supported as NE.
Let ~x = (~x1; ~x2; :::; ~xn) denote a prole of outputs such that ~xi > 0 for all i.
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 1, when  is su¢ ciently close to 1, there is no NE strategy
prole, fstgt; such that there is an  > 0 with i(st) +   Mi in each t; yielding ~x in a period.
Proof. Suppose there is such strategy prole. Let j be the rm such that AV Cj(~xj) 
AV Ci(~xi) for all i. Clearly all prots at ~x must be non-negative.
First, let j(~xj ; ~x j) > 0. Let y be such that j(~xj + y; ~x j) = 0. The existence of y is guaranteed
by Assumption 1. Now we have that
p(y +
nP
i
~xi) = AV Cj(~xj + y) < AV Cj(~xj)  AV Ci(~xi); (3.31)
so all rms except j are ruined and j is a monopolist from this period on. For  su¢ ciently close to 1,
this unilateral change in output increases discounted prots (the same argument as for Proposition
3 can be applied here), which contradicts that the notion that we are in a NE.
Now consider the case where j(~xj ; ~x j) = 0. Since AV Cj(~xj)  AV Ci(~xi) for all i and to produce
zero is always an option it must be that AV Cj(~xj) = AV Ci(~xi) = p(
Pn
i=1 ~xi) for all i. If ~x is BF we
have shown that it cannot be supported as an NE. If the allocation is not BF, this means that 9k and
a xk such that with the resultant price, p(xk+
P
i6=k ~xi), at least one rm is bankrupted. However,
since AV Cj(~xj) = AV Ci(~xi) i; j 6= k this means that all rms except k can be bankrupted. Thus
when  is su¢ ciently close to 1, rm k has incentives to choose xk and to be a monopolist from
this period on. Again, the same argument as for Proposition 3 can be applied here to show that,
in this case, the deviation increases discounted prots which contradicts the notion that we are in
an NE.
The question arises as to whether the bound on the number of active rms in the previous result
is tight. The following example shows that when n = 3 there are SPNE with two active rms.
Example 6. Suppose that there are three rms with constant marginal costs equal to zero, a xed
cost K = 1000, and an inverse demand function p(
P3
i=1 xi) = 100 
P3
i=1 xi. Consider the following
strategies8.
8These strategies are Markovian in the sense that they only depend on the state, dened as the set of rms.
25
(S1) For rm 1: in the rst period, produce zero output. Thereafter, if rms 2 and 3 exists, produce
zero output. If, at least, one of these two rms has disappeared, produce the monopoly output.
(S2) For rms 2 and 3: in the rst period, produce the Cournot duopoly output. Thereafter,
if the three rms exists, produce the Cournot duopoly output. If one of these two rms has
disappeared and rm 1 exists, the remaining rm produces zero output. If one of these two rms
has disappeared and rm 1 does not exists, produce the monopoly output. If rm 2 and 3 exist
but rm 1 has disappeared, then rm 2 produces the monopoly output and rm 3 produces cero
output.
To prove that (S1) and (S2) yield an SPNE, we rst note that in this example the following two
conditions hold:
(C1) When rms 2 and 3 produce the Cournot duopoly, they obtain positive prots and the best
reply by rm 1 is zero. Furthermore, rm 1 cannot bankrupt either rm 2 or rm 3. Note, however,
that the Cournot duopoly is not BF .
(C2) When one rm produces the monopoly output, this rm obtains non-negative prots and
limits the entry of the other rms.
By the one-stage-deviation principle, a deviation is protable if and only if rm i can prot by
deviating from the original strategy in period t only and conforming thereafter.
We rst show that there is no protable deviation from any subgame in which the three rms exist.
Clearly, since rm 1 cannot bankrupt rm 2 or rm 3 when those rms are producing the Cournot
duopoly output and the best reply of rm 1 is to produce cero, no deviation can give rm 1 a
better payo¤. Thus, rm 1 has no incentives to deviate in these subgames. Firms 2 and 3 are
completely symmetric in the subgames, so we show that rm 2 has no incentives to deviate; the
same argument applies to rm 3. Firm 2 has no incentive to kill rm 3 when they are in a duopoly
because it will not enjoy any prots thereafter. Furthermore, rm 2 has not incentives to deviate
from the duopoly outcome when the three rms exist.
Second, we show that there is no protable deviation from any subgame in which two rms exist.
When only two rms exist, one produces the monopoly output, which limits the entry of the other
rm, so no protable deviation exists.
Finally, in subgames in which only one rm exists, there are not protable deviations since that
rm is producing the monopoly output.
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4. Final Remarks
In this paper we have developed a theory of dynamic competition in which rms may bankrupt
each other. We focussed on allocations that are BF in which a rm can bankrupt others only by
bankrupting itself. We have characterized BF allocations under decreasing, constant and increasing
returns. Finally, we have shown how BF allocations can be sustained as Nash equilibria in a dynamic
game. Our concept of BF allowed us to understand the structure of Nash equilibria in the dynamic
game. When there are two rms or increasing average costs, BF plays the leading role when
players are very patient. However we have shown that allocation other than BF can be sustained
as subgame perfect Nash equilibria.9
Our results are obtained at the cost of making several simplications to make the model
tractable. For instance, we did not consider coalitions of rms in the denition of BF alloca-
tions or renements of SPNE (such as renegotiation-proof) to get rid of some equilibria. It is likely
that these extensions will not qualitatively alter the nature of our results. However, other issues
neglected here might a¤ect our conclusions signicantly. Among these the following might be of
particular importance.
Mixed strategies
Throughout the paper we have assumed that rms only use pure strategies, but a good way of
avoiding bankruptcy might be to use mixed strategies as boxers use random movements to avoid
easy hits. We argue that when n = 2, if the actions played in equilibrium involve a randomization
and one of these actions is not BF, for  close enough to 1, the best strategy of the other rm consists
in choosing an action that will bankrupt this rm. This is because sooner or later the probability
that the action which is not BF is played is close to 1 so this rm will be ruined and the predating
rm will enjoy monopoly prots forever. Thus, in this case the BF set gives us a indication of which
type of actions will arise in equilibria, regardless of what kind of strategy is played by the agents.
However, in other cases the introduction of mixed strategies might substantially enlarge the set of
allocations that might be supported as equilibria of the dynamic game.
No accumulation
In this paper we focused on actions that bankrupt other rms, but we did not consider the other
9BF allocations may also be relevant in other circumstances such as when managers are so risk-averse that they
would never choose an allocation by which they can be driven out of business.
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side of bankruptcy, namely the funds that might support or deter aggressive strategies (the "deep
pocket" argument). Our result when n = 2 might survive when accumulation is considered. Indeed,
suppose as a rst approximation that in each period the rms transfer an exogenous quantity of
their wealth to next period. Then in each period we can dene a BF set that depends on the wealth
accumulated by each rm. If in a period the action chosen by, say, rm 1, is not BF, rm 2 may get
rid of rm 1 and enjoy monopoly prots forever. When  is su¢ ciently close to 1, this is optimal
for rm 2. In other cases, accumulation of prots might play an important role shaping the NE set
as in the model of Rosenthal and Rubinstein (1984).10
Credit
If credit is given on the basis of past performance, the redenition of the BF set sketched in the
previous paragraph can be applied here and credits can be incorporated into the model. However,
if credit is given on the basis of future performance, we have a problem because future performance
also depends on credit (via the BF constraints), which makes this problem extremely complex.
This points to a deep conceptual problem about credit in oligopolistic markets where rms might
be bankrupted. This topic should be the subject of future research.
Entry
In this paper we assumed a given number of competitors. This implies that the disappearance
of a rm does not bring a new one in the market. Of course this should not be taken literally. What
we mean is that if entry does not quickly follow it makes sense, as a rst approximation, to analyze
the model with a given number of rms. For instance when n = 2 and demand and costs are linear,
ruining a rm is a good investment even if monopoly last for one period (this example is available
under request). In other cases, though, the nature of equilibria will be altered if, for instance, entry
immediately follows the ruin of a competitor as in the model of Rosenthal and Spady (1989).11
Buying Competitors
In our model, there is no option to buy a rm. Sometimes it is argued that buying an opponent
may be a cheaper and safer strategy than ruining it. We do not deny that buying competitors
10They characterize a subset of the Nash equilibria assuming that each player regards ruin of the other player as
the best possible outcome and his own ruin as the worst possible outcome.
11They consider a prisoners dilemma in continuous time in a market with room for two rms only. When a rm
is bankrupted, this rm is immediately replaced by a new entrant. They show that some kind of predatory behavior
can arise in equilibrium.
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plays an important role in business practices. However, we contend that under the option of buying,
ruining a competitor is irrational. First, buying competitors may be forbidden by a regulatory body
because of anticompetitive e¤ects. Second, when the owner of a rm sells it to competitors, this
does not stop her from creating a new rm and nance it with the money received from selling the
old one. In other words, selling a rm is not equivalent to a contract in which the owner commits
not to enter into a market again. Thus, bankruptcy may be the only credible way of getting rid of
a competitor. Finally, buying and ruining of competitors may complement each other because the
acquisition value may depend on the aggressiveness of the buyer in the past; see Burns (1986) for
some evidence in the American tobacco industry. Thus, it seems that a better understanding of
the mechanism of ruin might help to further enhancement of our understanding of how the buying
mechanism works in this case.
Summing up, the model presented in this paper illuminates certain aspects of the equilibrium in
oligopolistic markets in which rms may bankrupt each other. We hope that the insights obtained
here can be used in further research in this area.
5. APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2. Given that
X
j 6=i xj >
X
j 6=i x^j ; at least for one k; xk > x^k . We show
that rm i can bankrupt rm k: Suppose, on the contrary, that this is not possible. Let ~xi be the
maximal output for rm i such that i(~xi; x i) = 0:Note that ~xi 6= 0; because otherwise,
X
j 6=i xj X
j
x^j and thus p(
X
j 6=i xj)  p(
X
j
x^j) = AV Ck(x^k) < AV Ck(xk); which would imply negative
prots for rm k: Thus ~xi 6= 0: Then, p(~xi +
X
j 6=i xj) = AV Ci(~xi): Since
X
j 6=i xj >
X
j 6=i x^j ;
p(~xi+
X
j 6=i x^j) > AV Ci(~xi): Since p(x^i+
X
j 6=i x^j) = AV Ci(x^i); ~xi < x^i: Since we have supposed
that rm i cannot bankrupt rm k; then p(~xi +
X
j 6=i xj)  AV Ck(xk): However, AV Ck(xk) >
AV Ck(x^k); and AV Ck(x^k) = AV Ci(x^i) > AV Ci(~xi): Thus, p(~xi +
X
j 6=i xj) > AV Ci(~xi) in
contradiction with the denition of ~xi: Thus, rm i can bankrupt rm k:
Proof of Lemma 3. Let x^S = (x^Si )i2S be such that x^
S
i 6= 0 and i(x^S) = 0 for all i 2 S: Let
x^S
0
= (x^S
0
i )i2S0 be such that x^
S0
i 6= 0 and i(x^S
0
) = 0 for all i 2 S0: Note rst that
X
i2S x^
S
i <X
i2S0 x^
S0
i ; and since AV Ck(x^
S0
k ) = p(
X
i2S0 x^
S0
i ) < p(
X
i2S x^
S
i ) = AV Ck(x^
S
k ) and average cost is
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increasing, then x^S
0
k < x^
S
k : Thus,
X
i2S;i6=k x^
S
i <
X
i2S0;i6=k x^
S0
i : Therefore,
S
0
km = max
xk2[0;x^S0k ]
k(xk;
X
i2S0;i6=k
x^S
0
i ) < max
xk2[0;x^S0k ]
k(xk;
X
i2S;i6=k
x^Si ) (5.1)
because prots are decreasing in the sum of the outputs of the other rms. And nally, since
x^S
0
k < x^
S
k ;
S
0
km = max
xk2[0;x^S0k ]
k(xk;
X
i2S0;i6=k
x^S
0
i )  max
xk2[0;x^Sk ]
k(xk;
X
i2S;i6=k
x^Si ) = 
S
km: (5.2)
Thus, S
0
km < 
S
km:
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